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Abstract: 
Using the Kauffman Firm Survey, we examine how characteristics of a startup’s assets, 
information about the startup, and entrepreneur attributes relate to financial structure at 
inception.  Startups with more physical assets or those where the entrepreneurs have other 
similar businesses are more likely to use external debt in the financial structure since these 
assets  have a high liquidation value. Startups with human capital embodied in the 
entrepreneur or intellectual property assets have a lower probability of using debt, 
consistent with the higher asset  specificity and lower collateral value of these assets.  
Startups characterized as small, unincorporated, solo, first-time, or home-office-based are 
more likely to be financed by self, family and friends, and importantly through credit cards, 
as these have both highly specific assets and information opacity.  More educated founders 
and non-African American founders are more likely to be financed by external sources.   
Controlling for other attributes of the startup, the financial structure of women-owned 
startups does not differ from that of other startups.  Hi-tech startups’ financial structure 
differs significantly from that of startups in other business sectors.    
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1. Introduction 
Little is known about the financial structure of startup firms.  Theoretical research and 
most empirical investigations have focused on large established firms, which can tap an array of 
financial sources, such as stock equity or commercial paper, a situation quite different from that 
facing small firms.  Most empirical research on small firms has focused on ongoing firms.  Yet, 
recent research has revealed the importance of startups for economic vibrancy and job creation. 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2010; Kane, 2010; Stangler, 2010).  During times of financial 
crisis, such as 2008–20010, it is difficult to determine whether credit conditions affect startup 
activity without having a benchmark assessment of the financial structure of startup firms 
during more normal credit conditions.  This paper draws on the theoretical and empirical 
literature of the financial structure of established firms to develop insights on startups, which are 
then examined using the Kauffman Firm Survey. 
  Our sample of startups is drawn from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), where 98 
percent of the businesses have fewer than 25 employees.1  We investigate the startups that are 
new in 2004, the first year of the survey.  The survey detail on these firms is impressive, 
including detailed data on sector of business activity, financial structure, entrepreneur, and 
location characteristics.2
Consistent with theoretical underpinnings based on asset specificity, we find that 
startups with more physical assets or those where the owners have other businesses are more 
likely than other startups to have external debt in the financial structure, since these assets have 
a higher liquidation value.  On the other hand, all else being equal, startups with higher human 
capital embodied in the entrepreneur or more intellectual property assets have a lower 
probability of using debt, consistent with the higher asset specificity and lower collateral value 
of these assets.   
  Before the KFS survey, such truly new and small business entities 
were little studied. 
                                                 
 
1 Usually, researchers classify small firms as entities that have fewer than 500 employees (Acs and Audretsch,1989 
[1]) 
2 Survival and performance data are available in the follow-on surveys.  3 
 
In terms of information opacity, startups located in the entrepreneur’s home are the 
most opaque and their financial structure is dominated by credit card debt.  Team-run startups 
and those with serial entrepreneurs are more likely than other startups to have internal and 
external equity in their financial structure, consistent with their greater personal resources and 
available information about the principals.   
In terms of owner attributes, older and more educated entrepreneurs are more likely to 
use debt financing, while African-American entrepreneurs are more likely to use their own 
resources to finance their businesses.  Controlling for other attributes of the startup, the 
financial structure of women-owned startups does not differ from that of male-owned startups.  
Regional factors and local conditions relate to the financial structure of startups.  Areas 
with better-educated resident populations are more likely to finance startups using internal 
debt.  Startups in innovative states and states with higher venture capital (VC) activity have a 
greater probability of external equity in their financial structure.  Startups in larger states have a 
higher probability of bank loans in their financial structure at inception.   
We also find that there are significant dissimilarities in the financial structure between 
hi-tech startups and startups in other sectors.  Some of the biggest differences can be traced to 
the relationship between financial structure and race, citizenship, and business knowledge (for 
example, having related businesses in the same sector).  
The next section briefly reviews the literature and develops hypotheses on the expected 
relationships between the financial structure of the startup firm and characteristics of its assets, 
information, and entrepreneurs.  Section 3 gives an overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey and 
our variable definitions and construction.  Section 4 presents our estimation methodology and 
results.  Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review  
Financial structure is central to a firm’s business strategy and has important implications 
for firm behavior.  In extensions of Modigliani-Miller (1958), theoretical analyses of large 
established firms have addressed how the degree of asset specificity (asset value at bankruptcy) 
and information opacity (aligning manager and share-holder interest) influences governance 4 
 
and financial structure.  Established-firm theory finds that, on the one hand, firms with highly 
specific assets (low liquidation value at bankruptcy) should have a higher proportion of equity 
relative to debt, since stockholders in principle can exercise greater control over the operations 
of the firm, whereas debt-holders cannot appropriate the highly specific assets.  On the other 
hand, under conditions of information opacity about managers’ activities, after internal 
resources, the firm should use bank debt, which disciplines management, and lastly equity, 
where ensuring the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders is more difficult.  
Our question:  does the ranking with regard to internal funds, external debt, and external equity 
that comes from established-firm theory play out for startups, which have different asset and 
information characteristics as well as a different set of financial sources?   
Previous research points out that, in the case of startups, there are no ongoing 
operations and no track record by which to judge the firm.  This information opacity makes 
external financing more difficult to obtain at the nascent stages (Bruno and Tyebjee, 1985; 
Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Cassar, 2004; Avery et al., 1998; Berger and Udell, 1995; Paulson and 
Townsend, 2004).   A startup’s potential external equity investors (such as angel or venture 
capital) may have limited information about the founder (unless s/he is a serial entrepreneur) or 
the prospects for the enterprise and may therefore demand a high ownership stake for a given 
financial outlay. From the standpoint of the owner-founder, internal finance is preferred, 
followed by external debt such as bank financing, and only lastly would the founder use 
expensive external equity where s/he has to give up a large ownership stake (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Scholtens, 1999; Huyghebaert and Gucht, 2007).   
However, these predictions based on information opacity are qualified by the 
characteristics of the assets of most startups.  In small startups the entrepreneur not only 
supplies managerial expertise, but also provides financial, knowledge, and human capital to the 
firm (Hart and Moore, 1995; Audretsch et al., 2009). Such specific human capital may not be 
easily transferable to alternative uses, which compounds the information opacity problem 
(Klein at. al. 1978; Williamson, 1975, 1985; Balakrishna and Fox, 1993; Kochhar, 1996; Vincente-
Lorente, 2001).  The ‘inalienable’ nature of human capital of the entrepreneur (Hart and Moore, 
1994) exacerbates the tension between debt holders and the owner because the owner can 5 
 
threaten to walk away. Therefore, firms with a high degree of asset specificity should be 
financed primarily by the entrepreneur’s own resources, followed by external equity such as 
venture capital, and last by external debt. 
Insights gleaned from theory suggest that startups would use internal funds first, 
followed by external resources, with the predictions on the external debt-equity mix unclear 
and dependent on the relative importance of asset specificity and information opacity.  
However, despite this theoretical preference for internal finance, Berger and Udell (2003) 
reveals the importance of debt financing for young firms in the United States, including high-
growth startups.3
Outside the issues of asset specificity, information opacity, and financial constraints, 
substantial empirical work focuses on the relationship between financial structure and 
entrepreneur characteristics such as their education (Bates, 1990; Cressy, 1996; Chandler and 
Hanks, 1998; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Astebro et al., 2005), race and ethnic ties (Bates, 1997a, 
b; Smallbone et al., 2003), gender (Fay and Williams, 1991; Verheul and Hurik, 2001), strategic 
alliances and networks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Coleman, 2000; Baum and Silverman, 2004; 
Chang, 2004), and experience of the founding team (Delmar and Shane, 2006).  Using the KFS 
allows us to examine these entrepreneur characteristics in conjunction with financial structure.  
With regard to race and gender, the KFS allows us to examine whether the financial structure of 
African-American and women-owned firms differs from that of other startups, and specifically 
to examine whether they have less external funding. 
  Therefore, in practice, resource constraints faced by the entrepreneur mean 
that startups are likely to rely primarily on external financing of one sort or another.  Our 
analysis using the detailed financial data in the KFS helps tease out the relative importance of 
internal equity and debt versus external equity and debt in the financial structure of startups, as 
well as the type of external debt.      
                                                 
 
3 They show that for startups less than two years old, debt accounts for 52 percent of capital structure, which is in line 
with the 50 percent debt found for all firms. Additionally, even high-growth firms have as much as 33 percent debt 
by the time they go public. 6 
 
The contribution of this paper arises from the fact that the KFS allows us to look at the 
financial structure of firms at inception and compare that to both the theories of established 
firms and the empirical investigations of ongoing small firms.   
We expect:  
H 1:  When information about the activities of the startup are particularly opaque, 
internal finance is used, followed by external bank debt, and last, by external equity  
H2:  When assets of the startup are highly specific, internal finance is used, followed by 
external equity such as venture capital, and last, by external bank debt. 
H3: African-American and/or women-owned startups do not use external sources of 
funds.  
3. Kauffman Firm Survey and Variable Construction  
  The primary data are obtained from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), which tracks from 
year-to-year a panel of about 5,000 businesses.  Each business has a unique identification 
number, and the original survey posed more than 1,400 questions to each firm in the survey, 
including detailed questions on financial structure, owner and founder characteristics, business 
and innovation activity, and location.4  Because we are interested in the financial structure of 
the startup at inception, we examine the firms in their founding year in 2004.5
  The KFS new venture is defined as “a new independent business that was created by a 
single person or a team of people; the purchase of an existing business; or the purchase of a 
  
                                                 
 
4 The KFS firms were drawn from all new businesses that were started in 2004 (and did not die within one year) as 
represented by the 237,843 enterprises in the Dunn and Bradstreet. The data were partitioned into six strata based on 
the industry technological category and the gender of the owner or CEO of the business. The industry technology 
classification ensured that a large sample of high-technology new businesses was represented in the KFS.  The gender 
category ensured that women-owned businesses were sufficiently represented in the final sample, although such 
businesses were not oversampled.  The weighted response rate (after including the sample weights) was 42.9 percent.  
See Kauffman Firm Survey 2005/2006: Baseline/First Follow-up (Scott Shane, Alicia Robb, Mathematica Policy 
Research Institute) for a detailed construction of the sampling weights and industry technological categories.    
5 The latest survey (third follow-up) was released in March 2009 and contains many additional variables such as the 
credit risk of the business and the source of competitive advantage as identified by the entrepreneur, as well as 
information about performance and survival.  7 
 
franchise.”6
  The KFS has detailed data (about a dozen different categories) on the types and amount 
of financing.  The grossest disaggregation distinguishes between debt and equity in the 
financial structure.  Along these lines, summary statistics for the 2004 sample (reported in Table 
1A) show that for the average startup, 64 percent
  We consider only true startups, not purchased or franchise firms, yielding our 
sample of 4,201 startups from the total KFS new venture total of 4,630.     
7
   
 of financing at inception is internal equity 
(primarily the entrepreneur’s own resources), 30 percent is external loans, and the rest is made 
up of loans from friends and family and external equity financing.  Compared with previous 
work on small firms (Berger and Udell, 2003) this suggests a much greater role for internal 
resources at startup than for young firms with ongoing operations. However, there is significant 
variation around these averages and this gross distinction between debt and equity does not 
take advantage of the KFS detail.  
3.1  Financial Structure Variables  
The rich detail in the KFS allows a deeper investigation of financial structure.  Since 
most firms are financed primarily by only one type of finance, we use discrete variables (for 
example, the binary 0,1) when describing financial structure for each firm. 8
•  Internal equity: 1 when the equity is entirely (or primarily) owned by entrepreneur/owners, 
their spouses and family, and/or by the employees of the company. About 26 percent of 
startups use internal equity as the primary method financing. 
 (See Table 1B).  
                                                 
 
6 Kauffman Firm Survey 2005/2006: Baseline/First Follow-up (Scott Shane, Alicia Robb, Mathematica Policy Research 
Institute). See also:  http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/kfs_fourth_040709.pdf 
7 Figure is derived from 68 percent internal financing times 93.5 percent internal equity. 
8 Empirical work on established firms often uses the share of different types of financing instead of the 0-1 binary 
choice.  However, for the startup financial data, the 0-1 choice variable is superior because some of the shares are 
small while others are at such extremes that there would not be a normal distribution for the share variable. 
Nevertheless, in 80 percent of the sample, there is a mix of finance used at startup inception. To investigate the 
robustness of our results to alternative cut-offs for the binary choice, we considered cutoffs ranging from 75 to 95 
percent.  That is, the internal equity dummy takes the value 1 if the share of internal equity financing was greater 
than 75, 80, 85, 90 or 95 percent. Robustness checks show that our results are unaffected by the choice of cutoff.  For 
the financial structure index used in the reported regressions we use the 75 percent cutoff.    8 
 
•  Internal debt: 1 when the entrepreneur takes loans from family, and/or employees, or 
borrows from other personal sources. About 3 percent of firms use this type of financing. 
•  External debt: 1 when the business takes loans from banks, the government, business loans 
from business credit cards, other businesses, and/or from other sources.  Seventy percent of 
startups use external debt to start their business. Of this external debt used to fund startups, 
58 percent of the value of external debt is credit card debt, 5.6 percent is bank debt, and the 
rest is loans from government and other sources. 
•  External equity: 1 when equity financing is obtained from angels, other businesses, 
government, venture capital, and/or other sources. Approximately 1.4 percent of ventures 
use external equity financing in their initial year of operation. 
 
Because external debt is so important, and because the decomposition of external debt into 
credit card and bank loans is important from a policy perspective, we also examine financial 
structure decomposed six ways:   
•  Owner resources:  1 when the equity is entirely (or primarily) owned by entrepreneur/owners 
•  Other internal resources: 1 when equity is owned by spouses and family, or by the employees 
of the company, and when an entrepreneur takes loans from family, and/or employees, or 
borrows from other personal sources.  
•  External debt—credit cards: 1 when the business is primarily funded by credit cards 
•  External debt—bank loans: 1 when the business is primarily funded by bank loans 
•  External debt—other: 1 when the business in primarily funded by other business and 
government sources.  
•  External equity: 1 when equity financing is obtained from angels, other businesses, 
government, venture capital, and/or other sources 
 
3.2 H1 and Measures of Information Opacity   
H1 implies that the greater is information opacity in a startup, the greater is the share of 
internal finance, with external debt such as bank financing next, and external equity the least 9 
 
used.  To test this hypothesis we create three measures of information opacity:  whether the firm 
operates from a home office, whether it is run by a team, and whether it is started by a serial 
entrepreneur.  (See Table 1C.)  
•  Home office dummy:  1 when the venture is based in the home of the founder. Fifty-nine 
percent of startups are located at the residence of the entrepreneur.   
•  Team-run business:  1 when there are two or more active owners. Twenty-nine percent of 
startups are run by teams.   
•  Serial entrepreneurship:  the total number of new  ventures started by the owners of this 
venture.  This measure varies between 0 and 1409
Startups that lease an office provide enough information to rent commercial real estate.  Serial 
entrepreneurs have a track record.  Firms with multiple owners may have greater personal 
resources and, therefore, less need for other financial resources; but with more owners, at least 
one might be known to the financial community, mitigating the information opacity problem.  
Therefore, based on H1, startups operating from a home office, that are run by solo and/or first-
time entrepreneurs are likely to have the greatest information problems.  For these startups, 
internal resources are likely to dominate financial structure, followed by external debt and very 
little external equity. 
 for the entire sample; on average, owners 
have started 1.4 new businesses.   
 
3.3 Measures of Asset Specificity 
H2 implies that the greater is asset specificity in startups, the higher is the share 
of internal finance, followed by external equity  such as equity from angels/venture 
capitalists, and finally by external debt.  To test this hypothesis, we create five measures 
of asset specificity spanning both specific human capital, and intangible and tangible 
assets.     
                                                 
 
9 Each business may have anywhere between 1 and 14 owners. This is the total number of businesses started by all 
the owners in aggregate. 10 
 
•  Business knowledge: the number of businesses owned by all the entrepreneurs (who 
are also managers of the business)10
•  Industry experience:  total years of work experience of the entrepreneurs (who are also 
managers of the business) in the same industry as this current venture.
 in the same industry as this current venture.  A 
majority of the entrepreneurs do not own other businesses in the same industry, 
although there is a wide dispersion, with some entrepreneurs owning up to six 
businesses in the same industry.  This variable measures knowledge of the business 
sector (human capital), but it may also proxy for the availability of other business 
assets that could be used as collateral (tangible capital).    
11
•  Tangible assets:  cash on hand, and the value of buildings, machinery,  and other 
property owned by the firm. Tangible assets can serve as collateral for obtaining 
loans from external sources and can have relatively high liquidation value compared 
with intangibles. 
  The total 
work experience of all the entrepreneurs is between zero and 150 years, the larger 
number being for  startups with a large number of owners. On average, 
entrepreneurs in firms have 14 to 17 years of work experience in the same industry. 
•  Intellectual property: Total units of intellectual property (IP) owned by the venture: 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.  The distribution of IP varies between 0 and 
103, with an average firm holding about 1.5 units.    
•  R&D personnel: the share of employees engaged in research and development 
(R&D). In 2004, the average startup had 38 percent of employees engaged in R&D.   
                                                 
 
10 We include the business experience of the owners as a specific asset only if the entrepreneurs are also the managers 
or operators of the business. Otherwise, if they hire a manager, the human capital of the entrepreneur may not be 
important for the success of the business. 
11 As alternative measures of specific human capital, we have used the number of businesses and work experience of 
the primary owner, the mean number of businesses and  work experience of all the owners; the results in our 
econometric estimates are unaltered. 11 
 
Tangible assets have high liquidation value in bankruptcy.  Other businesses owned by 
the entrepreneur may be pledged as collateral or their retained earnings used to finance 
the new firm.  The value of intellectual property and the activities of R&D personnel, on 
the other hand, are less certain.  If the firm owns patents that can be licensed out or sold 
to other firms, then such an asset would have low specificity and potentially high 
liquidation value.  But, for most of our sample, IP consists of trademarks and copyrights 
that are particular to a venture and that may be valuable as ongoing assets, but would 
have low liquidation value.  
Following H2, we expect startups with high amounts of human capital to be 
financed primarily by internal sources, and specifically by internal equity.  We expect 
firms with a high proportion of tangible assets or access to other businesses to have a 
preponderance of external financing, and within that to use debt financing rather than 
equity financing. We expect firms with a high proportion of intangible assets to have 
more internal financing, followed by external equity, and then external debt.   
 
3.4 Entrepreneur Attributes   
H3, which is derived from other empirical work, implies that African-American and/or 
women-owned startups do not use external sources of funds.  To test this hypothesis we use the 
rich array of entrepreneur characteristics in the KFS. 12
o  Black primary owner:  1 when the main owner is of African-American descent. Eight-and-a-
half percent of startups in the KFS sample have African-American owners.  
 
o  Woman primary owner:  1 if the main owner is a woman.  Twenty-six percent of startups in 
the KFS sample have a woman as the primary owner.  
                                                 
 
12 One characteristic of owners and startups that is not available in the KFS dataset is owner wealth. Wealth of the 
owners is an important underpinning of financial structure and it is unfortunate that we lack this information.  We 
attempt to get at this aspect through the variables measuring startup characteristics in the next sub-section.     12 
 
o  Age of the primary owner: Measures general life experience and potentially more extensive 
business networks.  The average age of the entrepreneur in our sample is about 45 years, 
although the range of ages varies between 17 and 87 years.  
o  Founder education: 1 when the primary owner has some college-level education.13
o  U.S. citizen primary owner: 1 when the entrepreneur is a U.S. citizen.  Approximately 96 
percent of entrepreneurs in the KFS sample are U.S. citizens.  
  In the KFS 
sample, about 60 percent of entrepreneurs have some higher education.  
From the previous literature we expect businesses owned by women and African-Americans to 
have greater difficulty in obtaining all forms of external financing, and therefore we expect to 
observe a preponderance of internal source financing, such  as funding from the founder, 
friends, and family.  With regard to citizenship, the tightening of credit regulations (‘know your 
customer’) after September 11,  2001 may mean that U.S. citizens will be relatively more able to 
access bank loans than non-citizens.  On the other hand, non-U.S. citizens may have tighter 
networks, which can help with financing (Saxenian).   
Following H3, we expect non-Black, non-woman startups; and startups with older 
founders, more education, and U.S.  citizenship, to have better credit market access, and 
therefore a higher likelihood of having external finance dominate in the financial structure of 
the startup.  
3.5 Venture, Industry, and Spatial Controls 
  In our sample of startups, there is significant variation in the concentration of startups 
by state and industry. By location, 11 percent of the ventures are located in California, followed 
by 7.6 percent in Texas, 5 percent in Michigan and Florida, and 4.5 percent in New York.  By 
industry, 25.7 percent of businesses are concentrated in Professional, Scientific or Technical 
Services, 11 percent in Primary Metal Manufacturing, about 8 to 9 percent each in Construction, 
                                                 
 
13 We also constructed alternative measures, such as a dummy for any of the owners having some college experience, 
or any of them having graduate degrees. In our econometric specification the results were very similar to those 
presented.  13 
 
Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services and Other 
Services, and another 5.6 percent in Retail Trade. 
We use various venture, industry, and state demographic and economic data as controls.  
We match these data with the KFS data by using the year, NAICS code, and state variable.  To 
avoid endogeneity, we lag the state-level variables. 
•  Size: Number of employees in the startup year. This measure ranges from 0 to 1,100. On 
average, most firms have two employees, with the median firm having only one employee.  
•  Incorporated company: 1 when the startup is a limited liability company, a subchapter S-
corporation, a C-corporation, a general partnership, or a limited partnership company.   In 
our sample about 65 percent are incorporated firms.  
o  Hi-Tech Industry:  1 when the firm is classified as one of the 6-digit, hi-tech NAICS sectors. 
Five hundred and eighty-seven  (or about 14 percent of the sample) are hi-tech startups 
using this definition.14
o  Highly educated population:  log value of the number of graduate students in the state from 
National Science Foundation’s 
  
Science and Technology Indicators
o  Innovative capacity: R&D intensity in a state.
.   
15
o  State size: total population from Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
  
o  VC activity: the number of venture capital (VC) deals from PricewaterhouseCoopers Money 
Tree report that is based on data derived from Thompson Financials.  The amount of VC 
activity varies between 0 and 1,535 deals, with an average of 99 deals per state in 2004. This 
variable is highly skewed, with states such as California, Massachusetts, and New York 
receiving a bulk of the deals.16
                                                 
 
14 Bureau of Labor Statistics NAICS categories are classified as Technology Generators vs. Technology Employers.  
We use the first definition.  Using the second definition gives us comparable results, although the coefficients are less 
precisely estimated since there are fewer ventures that are categorized as hi-tech using the second definition. In 
addition, we considered a hi-tech industry dummy based on the strata that Kauffman uses; there is no substantial 
change to our results. 
 
15 Defined as R&D spending (from the National Science Foundation’s Science and Technology Indicators) divided by 
gross  state product (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). As an alternative measure of innovation we used the 
number of patents by state, year, and industrial categories (NAICS code) (obtained from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office). Our results are unchanged. 
16 Using the amount of VC investment gives us the same result. 14 
 
Finally,  state fixed-effects are used to control for time-invariant state characteristics not 
captured in the data.  Industry fixed-effects use a 2-digit NAICS code to control for time-
invariant industry specific effects. 
4. Estimation Methodology and Results  
We use multi-nominal logit to investigate how asset specificity, information opacity, and 
entrepreneur attributes and startup characteristics are related to the financial structure of a 
startup in its founding year.  The generalized form for the response probabilities for the model 
is given in the following equation:    
( )
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For our main assessment of the KFS financial structure, we consider the four-way 
multinomial choice of financial source:  for example, internal equity, internal debt, external 
equity, and external debt, and then the six-way decomposition that focuses on the types of 
external debt.  
4.1 Financial Structure Four Ways:  Internal Debt/Equity vs. External      
       Debt/Equity 
To investigate the financial structures common to startups we estimate the multinomial 
logit model in Table 2. The base type of finance is internal equity: owner, to which we compare 
internal debt: family and friends (column 1), external debt: bank/credit card/other (column 2) 
and external equity: VC/angel and other (column 3).  We include state and industry (2-digit 
NAICS) controls along with our key variables of interest on assets, information opacity, and 
owner and venture characteristics. In the tables we present the raw coefficients, and for the 
discussion below we present the odds ratios based on the relevant tables. 
With regard to the measures of asset specificity, we find that greater tangible assets 
increase the probability that the startup has both internal and external debt in its financial 15 
 
structure. Calculating odds ratios, we find that evaluated at the mean, a thousand dollar 
increase in physical assets increases the probability of using debt by approximately 3.4 
percent.17
With regard to the variables measuring information opacity, firms led by teams are more 
likely to finance operations through the personal resources of the owners or, as expected, obtain 
external equity rather than finance through debt. Calculating the odds ratios, we find that a 
team-led startup is 43 percent less likely to use internal debt and 32 percent less likely to use 
external debt compared to internal equity.  A home-office based startup is equally likely to use 
the owner’s personal resources or external debt, and, as expected, is approximately 62 percent 
less likely to use external equity or borrow from family.  
  This is consistent with these assets having a higher liquidation value, making them 
superior as collateral for external loans or borrowing from friends and family. Higher business 
knowledge (as a measure of human capital, but also of potentially available collateral) reduces 
the probability of having external equity in the financial structure, consistent with the owners’ 
using their other business assets as collateral for debt.  In fact, a 1 unit increase in the business 
knowledge of the entrepreneur (say, if they have one more business entity already) decreases 
the probability  of using external equity by 80 percent.  Higher industry experience  of the 
entrepreneur (as specific human capital) reduces the probability of using both internal and 
external debt:  an increase of 1 unit (say, one year of experience) is associated with a  5 
percentage point decrease in probability. This lower probability of debt use is consistent with 
lenders worrying that the entrepreneur could walk away from the startup’s debt obligations.  
Higher intellectual property reduces the probability of using external debt to finance a startup, 
although this effect is not economically significant.  
Consistent with other research, startups owned by African-American entrepreneurs have 
a lower probability of having any type of external finance, especially external equity, and 
instead finance their firms through personal resources. Based on odds ratios, we find that such 
businesses are 60 percent less likely to use external debt and 98 percent less likely to use 
                                                 
 
17 The mean for physical assets is $1764.40.   16 
 
external equity, compared to using internal equity.  In contrast to other research, women owners18 
do not show a different financial structure from startups where the primary owner is male.  U.S. 
citizen19 and non-U.S. citizen entrepreneurs have similar startup financial structures.  Ventures 
with older entrepreneurs (age) are less likely to finance their operations by borrowing from 
friends and family. College educated entrepreneurs are 22 percent more likely to have external 
debt as opposed to other forms of financing, and this may be because these entrepreneurs 
possess sufficient financial sophistication to allow them to successfully navigate bank and 
government loan programs.20
 Firm characteristics are also influential in determining the financing used by startups. 
Incorporated firms and larger (size) startups have a greater probability of using external finance 
than sole proprietorships or small firms, which tend to be financed by internal sources.  
   
State characteristics are also important. New ventures located in highly educated states 
tend to be financed by internal rather than external sources. Startups in larger states are less 
likely to borrow from friends and family.  Startups in more innovative states are more likely to 
use external equity. Robust VC activity in a state is associated with a higher likelihood of using 
external equity compared to internal equity, but also a higher probability of internal debt versus 
internal equity.  
In summary, we find that new business ventures are more likely to have external debt 
financing if they have more physical assets and more business knowledge (as collateral) since 
these have a high liquidation value.  Consistent with its low collateral value, startups with 
higher human capital embodied in the entrepreneur have a lower probability of using debt.  
Team-run startups are less likely to use debt finance, and consistent with their greater 
information, more likely to have external equity.  Startups located in the entrepreneur’s home 
are less likely to borrow from friends and family, and, consistent with their information opacity, 
are less likely to have external equity in their financial structure.  Educated entrepreneurs are 
more likely to use debt financing, while African-American entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
                                                 
 
18 Differs from Fay and Williams, 1991; Verheul and Hurik, 2001. 
19 Compares with Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Coleman and Cohn, 2000; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Chang, 2004. 
20 Consistent with (Bates, 1990; Cressy, 1996; Chandler and Hanks, 1998; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Astebro et al., 
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their own resources to finance their businesses. External finance tends to be a significant share 
of the financial structure of large and incorporated startups.  
4.2 Financial Structure Six Ways:  A Deeper Look into Debt in the  
        Financial Structure 
The KFS reveals the wide variety of sources of startup finance.  Using this rich detail, we 
can tease out more information about the financial structure of startups and how it is related to 
asset-specificity and information-opacity characteristics.   The largest source of external funding 
is from external debt.  Looking deeper into this category reveals that external debt comprises 
bank loans, credit card use, and other debt (such as government lending and loans from other 
businesses).   
Table 3 looks more deeply into the type of external debt in the financial structure of 
startups, looking at a six-way decomposition of the financial structure of the startup: Owner 
equity is the base financial resource.  The five other types of finance are:  (i) internal debt and 
equity, that is, equity owned by family, and loans from friends, family, and employees, (ii) 
external debt: bank loan, (iii) external debt: personal or business credit card, (iv) external debt: 
other, such as loans from the government and other businesses, (v) equity: VCs and angel 
investors, and other sources. 
The six-way decomposition of financial structure can be compared to the four-way 
decomposition.  Startups with greater tangible assets are more likely to finance their operations 
through all types of debt, both internal and external.  Other things being equal, as tangible 
capital increases by a thousand dollars (evaluated at the mean), new ventures are 5.7 percent 
more likely to use bank loans and 3.4 percent more likely to use credit cards to finance their 
operations than to use the owners’ personal resources. Given entrepreneur industry experience or 
intellectual property in the startup, the lower probability of using external debt found in Table 2 
can be traced to a decline in the probability of using credit card debt, although the effect is not 
economically significant. As in Table 2, an increase in business knowledge of the entrepreneur 
reduces the likelihood of external equity in the financial structure of the startup.  
 In Table 2, serial entrepreneurship and home-based office were not related to financial 
structure.  However, in Table 3 we observe that serial entrepreneurs are equally likely to finance 18 
 
their businesses using their own resources, bank loans, or external equity, since more 
information is available about these entrepreneurs, which mitigates the information opacity 
problem.  Additionally, based on odds ratios, we find that such a venture is 3.3 percent less 
likely to be financed by credit card debt and 2.6 percent more likely to be financed by other 
types of external debt such as government loans.21
Table 2 showed that the financial structure of team startups was less likely than that of 
other startups to include debt. From Table 3 we find that the result is driven by credit card debt 
and other external loans. Team-run firms are 35 percent less likely than other startups to finance 
their operations using credit cards and 72 percent less likely to use nonbank loans compared to 
internal equity.   
  These results are consistent with serial 
entrepreneurs having a wealth base from which to finance the new business, and with their 
being familiar with government loan programs, so that they tend not to use credit cards to 
finance the startup.  
In Table 2, the home-office based startup was equally likely as other startups to use owner 
equity as external debt.  Table 3 reveals that the main type of external debt used by the home-
based startup is credit card debt.  Entrepreneurs with home offices are 17 percent more likely to 
use credit card debt and 51 percent less likely to use nonbank external debt than other startups.  
In Table 2 we saw that the financial structure of African-American owner startups was 
less likely to use external debt.  Table 3 shows that this result comes from much less likely use of 
credit card or nonbank debt;  African-American entrepreneurs are equally likely to use either 
their own resources or bank loans.  Similar to the results in Table 2, the results in Table 3 show 
that the financial structure of women-owned startups does not differ from the norm for startups.   
 
4.3 The Hi-Tech Story 
  The financial structure of hi-tech startups attracts substantial interest, particularly given 
the supposed role of angel investors and venture capital.  In Table 4, we re-estimate the 
                                                 
 
21 Compares to Delmar and Shane, 2006. 19 
 
multinomial logit model presented in Table 2, and add a hi-tech dummy and interactions 
between regressors and the hi-tech dummy. The hi-tech dummy captures the level effect and 
shows whether the overall financial structure of hi-tech startups differs from that of other 
startups.  Significant interaction terms show whether the nature of assets, information opacity, 
and owner and firm characteristics interact differently with the financial structure of hi-tech 
startups than with the financial structure of all other startups.   
From Table 4 we find that the hi-tech dummy is negative and significant for internal 
debt and positive and significant for external equity. This implies that hi-tech startups are less 
likely to borrow from friends and family and are more likely to use external equity financing as 
opposed to their own resources.  Thus, the overall financial structure of the hi-tech startup does 
differ from the startup norm.    
The interactions between the hi-tech dummy and regressors suggest specific factors 
underpinning the different financial structure of hi-tech startups.  Business knowledge of the hi-
tech entrepreneurs (a proxy for collateral value of other businesses) increases the probability of 
borrowing from friends and family (column 1b)—these may be the true angel investors, since 
the likelihood of the hi-tech startups using external equity (coded as VC/angel) is lower than for 
non-hi-tech startups (column 3b).  Additionally, we find that in hi-tech startups, serial 
entrepreneurs are less likely to use either external debt (column 2b) or equity (column 3b) than 
internal resources.  
With regard to intellectual property, in column 2a the coefficient is negative and 
significant, implying that firms with more intellectual property are less likely to use external 
debt than startups in traditional sectors. However, from column 2b, the interaction term is 
positive and significant, implying that startups with intellectual property are more likely to use 
external debt compared to the owners’ personal resources. For hi-tech startups, patents may 
signal a future revenue stream that can help to secure external loans.  Overall, the magnitude of 
the positive coefficient swamps the negative effect, implying that overall the effect of 
intellectual property on the use of external financing is positive.  
There is great heterogeneity in the relationship between owner attributes and the 
financial structure of startups in hi-tech versus all other business sectors. For example, we find 20 
 
that hi-tech startups with African-American entrepreneurs are less likely than startups in other 
industries to borrow from friends and family (column 1b).  The level effect and the interaction 
effect wash out for external equity (column 3a and 3b), which is not the case for their non-black 
counterparts.  Women-owned hi-tech startups do not differ in financial structure from the hi-
tech norm.  U.S. citizen startups in the hi-tech sector are more likely than non-U.S. citizen 
startups to borrow from friends and family (column 1b). 
The financial structure of hi-tech startups also differs from the startup norm with respect 
to the education and age of the entrepreneur. We find that for external debt, the level effect of 
education is positive, while the interaction term between the education dummy and the hi-tech 
dummy is negative and significant. This implies that the financial structure of hi-tech startups 
started by college-educated entrepreneurs has less external debt than other startups do. Hi-tech 
startups with older entrepreneurs are less likely than other startups to use external equity.  
This is one of the few papers that document how the financial structure of hi-tech 
startups differs from that of other startups along the dimensions of entrepreneurial human 
capital, intellectual property, race, education, and citizenship of the entrepreneur. 
5. Conclusion 
  Startups are likely to suffer from greater information opacity and higher asset specificity 
than large established firms, or even small ongoing firms.  For startups, the existence of human 
capital-specific assets, coupled with small levels of traditional tangible assets that can serve as 
collateral, and the lack of information and reputation suggest constraints on borrowing from 
external sources.  Therefore, we should expect to observe a higher overall dependence on 
internal sources of funds in the financial structure of startups.  However, because startups may 
face financial constraints, the entrepreneur will look to augment personal resources.   Using the 
Kauffman Firm Survey of new businesses, we investigate how information opacity and asset 
specificity are related to the initial financial structure of startups, controlling for owner’s 
attributes, and firm, sector, and spatial characteristics.   21 
 
Consistent with theoretical underpinnings based on asset specificity, we find that 
startups with more tangible assets as potential collateral are more likely to use external debt in 
the financial structure, since these assets have a high liquidation value.  Entrepreneurs with 
other businesses as collateral are less likely to give up control to external equity investors.  On 
the other hand, all else equal, startups with higher human capital embodied in the entrepreneur 
or more intellectual property assets have a lower probability of using debt than other startups, 
consistent with the higher asset specificity and lower collateral value of these assets.   
In terms of information opacity, startups located in the entrepreneur’s home are the 
most opaque and their financial structure is dominated by credit card debt.  Team-run startups 
are less likely to use debt finance, particularly credit cards and other external loans and, 
consistent with their greater personal resources and available information, more likely to have 
internal and external equity in their financial structure. Serial entrepreneurs are equally likely to 
finance their businesses using their own resources, bank loans, or external equity, since more 
information is available about these entrepreneurs, which mitigates the information opacity 
problem.   
In terms of owner attributes, some, but importantly not all, of our findings mirror the 
research on ongoing small businesses.  Educated entrepreneurs are more likely to use debt 
financing.    African-American entrepreneurs are more likely to use their own resources to 
finance their business and less likely to use credit card or nonbank debt.  An important finding 
is that the financial structure of women-owned startups does not differ from that  of male-
owned startups, controlling for many other attributes.  
Regional factors and local conditions relate to the financial structure of startups.  Areas 
with better-educated resident populations may have greater personal resources to finance 
startups using internal debt.  Startups in innovative states and states with higher venture capital 
activity have a greater probability of having external equity in their financial structure.  Startups 
in larger states have a higher probability of having bank loans in their financial structure.   
We also find significant dissimilarities in the financial structure of hi-tech startups and 
startup in other sectors.  Some of the biggest differences can be traced to the relationship 
between financial structure and race, citizenship, and business knowledge.  22 
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Financial Structure 2004  
 




SD  Min  Max 
Amt. Total Financing  4201  165660  13250  3.53M  0  224M 
Amt. of External Financing   4201  94488  300  2.10M  0  133M 
Amt. of Internal Financing   4201  71172  7500  1.47M  0  92M 
Amt. Internal Equity  4201  46295  6000  0.43M  0  25M 
Amt. Internal Debt   4201  24876  0  1.39M  0  90M 
Amt. of External Debt  4201  66992  0  1.46M  0  93M 
Amt. of External Equity  4201  27496  0  0.71M  0  40M 
  Obs  Mean (%)  Median (%)  SD  Min  Max 
% of Internal Financing in Total  4201  68.05  86.96  0.370  0  1 
% of Equity in Internal Financing   4201  93.51  100  0.220  0  1 
% of Debt in External Financing  4201  96.10  100  0.186  0  1 
% of Int. Equity  in Total Amt.  4201  64.32  81.05  0.388  0  1 
% of Int. Debt in Total Amt.  4201  3.73  0  0.154  0  1 
% of Ext. Debt  in Total Amt.  4201  30.41  9.09  0.365  0  1 




Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables - 2004  
 
Discrete Variables  Obs.  Ones  %  
Four Choices       
Internal Equity Dummy  4201  1077  25.64 
Internal Debt Dummy  4201  127  3.02 
External Debt Dummy  4201  2941  70.01 
External Equity Dummy  4201  56  1.39 
Six Choices       
Owner’s Personal Resources 
(Equity & Debt) 
4023  1070  26.60 
Financing from Family/ Friends/ 
Employees (Equity & Debt) 
4023  131  3.26 
Bank Debt  4023  224  5.57 
Credit Card Debt  4023  2343  58.24 
Loans from Govt., Others.  4023  199  4.95 
External Equity Financing 
(VC/Angel, Other) 
4023  56  1.39 
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TABLE  1C 
Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables - 2004  
 
 
Independent Variables           
Assets           
  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Tangible Assets (Log Amount)  7.475  9.558  6.607  -9.210  19.431 
Human Capital 1: Business Knowledge   0.240  0  0.519  0  6 
Human Capital 2: Industry Experience  16.824  14  15.592  0  150 
Human Capital 3: Share of R&D Personnel  0.380  0  0.620  0  5 
Intellectual Property  1.345  0  7.738  0  103 
Information Opacity           
Serial Entrepreneurship  1.375  0  4.518  0  140 
  Ones  Zeros  % Ones  Obs.   
Team Run Business Dummy  1224  2977  29.14  4201   
Home Office Dummy  2458  1743  58.51  4201   
Owner Attributes           
Black Primary Owner Dummy  355  3846  8.45  4201   
Woman Primary Owner Dummy  1103  3098  26.26  4201   
Education Level Dummy  2525  1676  60.10  4201   
US Citizen Primary Owner Dummy  4052  149  96.45  4201   
  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Age of Primary Owner  45.022  44  10.887  17  87 
Venture Characteristics           
Size of Venture (Log No. of Employees)  0.345  0  0.664  0  4.318 
  Ones  Zeros  % Ones  Obs.   
Incorporated Company Dummy  2714  1487  64.60  4201   
Hi-Tech Dummy  587  3614  13.97  4201   
           
  Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Highly Educated Population Size (Log No 
Graduate Students) 
9.485  9.423  0.919  6.269  10.787 
Innovative Capacity of State (R&D 
Intensity) 
2.418  2.044  1.291  0.391  7.427 
State Size (Log Population)  15.933  15.955  0.889  13.114  17.363 
VC Activity in State (No. of VC Deals)  251.19  99  458.99  0  1535.75 
 
  






Financial Structure: Four-Way  
 






 Coefficient  1  2  3 
Assets       
Tangible Assets    0.056***   0.057***   0.018 
Human Capital 1: Business Knowledge  -0.006  -0.222  -1.597* 
Human Capital 2: Industry Experience  -0.032**  -0.012**  -0.009 
Human Capital 3: Share of R&D Personnel   0.090   0.038   0.100 
Knowledge Capital  -0.016  -0.010*   0.017 
Information Opacity       
Serial Entrepreneur  -0.033  -0.004   0.028 
Team Run Business Dummy  -1.001**  -0.378***  -0.668 
Home Office Dummy  -0.961***   0.104  -1.014* 
Owner Attributes       
Black Primary Owner Dummy  -0.144  -0.891***  -3.717*** 
Woman Primary Owner Dummy  -0.159   0.026   0.056 
Age of Primary Owner   -0.032***  -0.001   0.024 
Education Level Dummy  -0.130   0.218**   0.548 
US Citizen Primary Owner Dummy  -0.491   0.092  -0.698 
Venture Characteristics       
Size of Venture   0.158   0.480***   0.790*** 
Incorporated Company Dummy  -0.278   0.374***  21.016*** 
State Characteristics (Lag 1 Yr.)       
Highly Educated Population Size  -0.646  -0.772*  -4.577*** 
Innovative Capacity of State   0.104   0.138   5.020*** 
State Size  -0.855**   0.602   0.239 
VC Activity in State   0.018***   0.0002   0.017*** 
Relevant Statistics       
Observations  4201  4201  4201 
Note: Estimation using a multinomial logit regression, with survey weights provided by the KFS survey data. 
Base category: Internal equity. Regression controls include:  Industry (2 digit NAICS) and State fixed effects. 
Funding decomposition:  127 startups funded primarily with internal debt, 2941 startups funded primarily with 
external debt, 56 startups primarily with external equity. Year=2004. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance at 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. 
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TABLE 3  
Financial Structure:  Six Way  
 
Base: Owner’s Equity 
and Debt 
Other Internal 









Coefficient  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5 
Assets 
Tangible Assets   0.068***   0.094***   0.055***   0.087***   0.216 
Human Capital 1: 
Business Knowledge 
 0.002  -0.101  -0.181  -0.165  -1.616* 
Human Capital 2: 
Industry Experience 
-0.018  -0.017  -0.010*  -0.018  -0.012 
Human Capital 3: Sh. 
of R&D Personnel 
 0.011  -0.187   0.057   0.240   0.078 
Intellectual Property  -0.014  -0.034  -0.010*  -0.006   0.016 
Information Opacity 
Serial Entrepreneur  -0.038   -0.0001  -0.033*   0.026**   0.029 
Team Run Bus. Dum.  -0.986***  -0.110  -0.350**  -0.724**  -0.708 
Home Office Dum.  -0.721***  -0.045   0.174*  -0.509***  -0.983* 
Owner Attributes 
Black Owner Dum.   0.022  -0.482  -0.882***  -0.748**  -3.694*** 
Woman Owner Dum.  -0.096  -0.258   0.064  -0.324   0.037 
Age of Primary Owner  -0.029***   0.003  -0.001   0.009   0.027 
Education Level Dum.  -0.102  -0.047   0.247***   0.176   0.492 
US Cit. Owner Dum.  -0.529   0.003   0.030   0.206  -0.716 
Venture Characteristics 
Size of Venture   0.221   0.680***   0.430***   0.921***   0.844*** 
Incorp. Co. Dum.  -0.052   0.635**   0.378***   0.149  20.910*** 
State Characteristics(Lag: 1 Year) 
Highly Edu. Pop. Size  -0.782  -1.113**  -0.796*  -4.794***  -5.033*** 
Innov. Cap. of State   0.126   0.972***   0.125   4.420***   5.122*** 
State Size  -0.742   7.574***   0.535   1.703***   0.217 
VC Activity in State   0.018***  -0.011***   0.0004   0.015***   0.018*** 
Relevant Statistics 
Observations   4023  4023  4023  4023  4023 
Note: Estimated using a multinomial logit regression, with survey weights provided by the KFS survey data. Base category: 
Owner’s personal resources (both debt and equity). Regression controls include: Industry (2 digit NAICS) and state fixed 
effects.  Funding decomposition:  131 startups funded primarily by friends/family or employees, 224 startups funded 
primarily with bank debt, 2343 use credit card debt, 199 use other external loans such as those from the government, 56 are 
financed using either VC or angel financing, or by other external equity. Year=2004. ‘*’, ‘**’ and ‘***’ denote significance 
at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
The Hi-Tech Story  
Note: Estimated using multinomial logit, with survey weights provided by the KFS survey data. Base category: Internal 
equity. Regression controls include: Industry (2 digit NAICS) and state fixed effects.  127 startups primarily funded by 
internal debt, 2941 startups funded primarily with external debt, 56 startups funded primarily with external equity. Year=2004. 









  1a  1b  2a  2b  3a  3b 
 Coefficient  Level  Interaction  Level  Interaction  Level  Interaction 
Assets             
Tangible Assets   0.057***  -0.053   0.057***   0.007   0.017   0.027 
Human Cap. 1: 
Bus. Knowledge 
 0.004  34.201***  -0.233*   0.365  -1.624*  -30.456*** 
Human Cap. 2: 
Industry Experience 
-0.031**  -0.055  -0.012**  -0.016  -0.006  -0.027 
Human Cap. 3: Sh. 
of R&D Personnel 
 0.090  -0.006   0.040  -0.040   0.133  -0.252 
Intellect. Property  -0.016  -0.223  -0.011*   0.048**   0.018   0.032 
Information Opacity           
Serial 
Entrepreneur 
-0.028  -0.147  -0.002  -0.057*   0.034  -0.053* 
Team Run Bus. 
Dum. 
-1.021**   1.225  -0.387***   0.147  -0.725   0.730 
Home Off. Dum.  -0.964***   0.398   0.102   0.166  -0.986*  -1.582 
Owner Attributes             
Black Owner.  -0.143  -34.801***  -0.899***   1.020*  -25.086***   25.878*** 
Woman Owner   -0.155  -0.146   0.026   0.079   0.089  -0.453 
Age Pri Owner  -0.033***   0.060  -0.001   0.011   0.028  -0.056* 
Education Level   -0.129   0.423   0.229**  -0.742***   0.564  -0.623 
US Citizen Own.   -0.515  19.322***   0.098  -0.351  -0.794   2.037 
Venture Characteristics           
High Tech Dum.  -21.934***     0.432     4.643***   
Size of Venture   0.165  -0.437   0.484***  -0.144   0.806***  -0.357 
Incorp. Co. Dum.  -0.267  -0.495   0.374***  -0.030   21.769***  -3.343 
State Characteristics(Lag 1 Year)         
Hi. Edu. Pop. Size  -0.632    -0.769*    -4.220***   
Innov. Cap. of State   0.101     0.137     4.894***   
State Size  -0.722**     0.602     0.390   
VC Activ. in State   0.017***     0.0002     0.016***   
Relevant Statistics             
Observations   4201     4201     4201   